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Action

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Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 4, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM

SECRET

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PARIS - DULTE-4

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN PARIS HAVING CONCLUDED THE LONDON PHASE OF MY TRIP. JOCK, LIVIE AND I SPENT LAST EVENING WITH MACMILLAN AND LLOYD AND ONE OR TWO OF THEIR ADVISERS. THEN THIS MORNING I SPENT AN HOUR AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT A MEETING WHICH INCLUDED ORMSBY-GORE, THE UK HEAD NEGOTIATOR AT THE SUSPENSION OF TESTING TALKS AT GENEVA. THE GOVERNMENT HAD CALLED HIM BACK TO LONDON FOR THIS PURPOSE.

THEN WE WENT OVER TO 10 DOWNING STREET AND THE PRIME MINISTER JOINED OUR TALKS FOR AN HOUR.

THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT OUR PRESIDENTIALLY APROVED PROGRAM FOR DEALING WITH A SOVIET TURN-OVER OF BERLIN AUTHORITY TO THE GDR WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS, HOWEVER, EASY TO DETECT A DISPOSITION ON THEIR PART TO BE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE OR DEAL WITH THE GDR IN THIS MATTER. THEIR GENERAL ATTITUDE IN THIS WHOLE AFFAIR IS BY OUR STANDARDS "SOFTER".

LAST NIGHT THE PRIME MINISTER TALKED IN A RATHER RAMBLING WAY ABOUT A POSSIBLE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SEMI-PERMANENT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PARTITION OF GERMANY AND THEN A THINNING OUT OF FORCES IN THE GENERAL CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA.

AT

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SECRET

Classification

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901040-42

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-2- DULTE 4, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM, FROM PARIS.

AT ALL THREE OF THE MEETINGS ON WHICH THIS CABLE REPORTS THERE WAS QUITE A LOT OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SUSPENSION OF TESTING NEGOTIATIONS.

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I BELIEVE I PERSUADED THE PRIME MINISTER TO GO ALONG WITH MY VIEW AND WHAT SEEMED TO BE LLOYD'S THAT WE SHOULD STAND PAT ON THE CONTROL ISSUE AND NOT AFFORD THE SOVIETS A PRETEXT FOR DIVERTING ATTENTION TO OTHER ISSUES. HAROLD SUGGESTED THAT IN PURSUANCE OF THAT TACTIC WE WOULD NEED TO DRAMATIZE THE SITUATION AND THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR YOU AND HIM TO WRITE A LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV ON THE SUBJECT. I SAID I SAW SOME POSSIBLE MERIT IN THIS AS THE SOVIETS HAVE REALLY PUT THEMSELVES IN A VERY EXPOSED POSITION.

WITH RESPECT TO HAROLD'S "SOLITARY PILGRIMAGE" TO MOSCOW SOME OF THE LONDON PAPERS HAVE BEEN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD BEEN CONSULTED AND HAD APPROVED OF THIS TRIP AND THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT MACMILLAN MIGHT SO INDICATE IN HIS STATEMENT THIS AFTERNOON TO THE HOUSE.

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-3- DULTE 4, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM, FROM PARIS.

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IN GENERAL I FOUND THIS TALK WITH HAROLD LESS SATISFACTORY THAN OUR USUAL TALKS. HE SEEMED TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER MATTERS, PERHAPS THE ELECTORAL SITUATION, AND HE WAS VAGUE AND RAMBLING AND INDECISIVE.

TOMORROW I SHALL BE MEETING WITH THE GREAT GENERAL AND PROBABLY ENCOUNTER PLENTY OF DECISIVENESS, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT PRECISELY THE KIND WE WOULD LIKE.

FAITHFULLY YOUR, FOSTER.

DULLES

~~SECRET~~